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Abstract In the present study, observers viewed displays in
which two equally salient color singletons were simulta-
neously present. Before each trial, observers received a
word cue (e.g., the word red, or green) or a symbolic cue (a
circle colored red or green) telling them which color
singleton to select on the upcoming trial. Even though
many theories of visual search predict that observers should
be able to selectively attend the target color singleton, the
results of the present study show that observers could not
select the target singleton without interference from the
irrelevant color singleton. The results indicate that the
irrelevant color singleton captured attention. Only when the
color of the target singleton remained the same from one
trial to the next was selection perfect—an effect that is
thought to be the result of passive automatic intertrial
priming. The results of the present study demonstrate the
limits of top-down attentional control.
Keywords Attention.Attention: Selective.Attentional
capture
Imagine a situation in which two uniquely colored and
highly distinguishable objects are present in the visual field.
Each time before you start searching, you are told which of
the two objects you need to select. For example, on one
trial, you need to select the red object, and on the next trial,
you need to select the green one. On the face of it, this
should be no problem: Everyone expects that people can
select the object they are told to select. This intuitive
assumption is reinforced by most theories on visual search
that predict that people can select the object needed for their
task. For example, the contingent capture hypothesis
predicts that observers can set themselves on each trial for
a particular color (Folk, Remington, & Jonhnston, 1992).
The guided search theory argues that top-down set can
increase the salience of the relevant feature dimension (in
this example: the feature “red” or “green”) so that attention
is (mostly) guided to relevant features only (Wolfe, 1994;
Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, & Hyle, 2003). Other theories argue
that visual selection is biased toward “some kind short-term
description of information” that describes what is needed
for the task at hand (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). This
attentional template ensures that stimuli that match that
description are selected over those that do not match
(Bundesen, 1990). Even though most theories predict
efficient top-down selection, here we show that selection
in a top-down manner is inefficient; people cannot flexibly
select the object needed for their task.
Recently, in a series of experiments, Theeuwes and
colleagues (Theeuwes, Reimann, & Mortier, 2006;
Theeuwes & van der Burg, 2007, 2008) tested the boundary
conditions of top-down selection. For example, in
Theeuwes et al. (2006), observers were confronted with
pop-out displays in which one element either had a unique
shape (one green diamond among five green circles) or a
unique color (a red circle among five green circles).
Observers had to respond to the orientation of a line
segment inside the unique popping-out element. Before
each trial, observers received a cue telling them with 80%
validity the likely feature property of the upcoming target
singleton. For example, observers received as a cue the
word color (or the word red) and knew with 80% validity
that the line segment they were looking for would be
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trial, the target line segment would appear in the shape
singleton (the green diamond). In the neutral condition, no
information was provided about the properties of the target
singleton. The results showed that preparing for the
upcoming target feature had no effect on reaction time
(RT; Theeuwes et al., 2006) or on perceptual sensitivity
(Theeuwes & van der Burg, 2007). In other words,
knowing that the popping out target is going to be a color
singleton instead of a shape singleton did not affect the
speed of selection or perceptual sensitivity.
These previous results were considered to be controver-
sial: Many theories of visual search (Bundesen, 1990;
Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Folk et al., 1992; Müller,
Reimann, & Krummenacher, 2003; Treisman, 1988) would
predict that endogenously preparing for the target feature
should improve visual search and should enhance percep-
tual selectivity. For example, according to Müller and
colleagues (e.g., Müller et al., 2003), a verbal cue telling
the upcoming feature dimension should enable observers to
allocate more weight to the relevant visual dimension.
Because these previous experiments were inconsistent with
their theory, Müller and Krummenacher (2006) tried to
replicate Theeuwes et al.’s( 2006) findings. Interestingly,
they found numerically exactly the same cue benefit (9 ms)
as did Theeuwes et al. (2006). However, unlike in
Theeuwes et al. (2006) and Müller and Krummenacher,
this 9-ms effect was statistically reliable presumably
because they made sure that observers had an extra
incentive to use the cue. Therefore, it seems that under
the right circumstances, these very small verbal cuing
effects may become statistically reliable.
In addition to the concern that observers may not have
used the cue in Theeuwes et al. (2006), there was the
concern that the task may have been too easy to see an
effect. Indeed, in each display, there was one popping-out
element with either a unique color or a unique shape.
Importantly, in each display, the only popping-out element
was always the target. Because the task was so easy,
knowing the likely dimension of the upcoming target may
not have helped much. This is consistent with the biased
competition model of attention (Desimone & Duncan,
1995). According to this view, competition among elements
is needed to see an attention effect (for a recent review, see
Beck & Kastner, 2009). Because in our display there was
only one popping-out element, there was basically no
competition. However, if two salient elements are simulta-
neously present in the visual field, visual attention is
needed to resolve the neural ambiguity sp that only the
relevant object continues to be represented in the system
(Luck, Girelli, McDermott, & Ford, 1997). Related to the
previous point: Maybe, because the task was so easy,
observers may have chosen not to use the verbal cue to
prepare for the upcoming target dimension. This may
explain why we did not see an effect of the cue.
To circumvent these concerns, in the present study, we
addressed the question of whether top-down knowledge can
improve visual search in a task in which there was
competition between two popping-out elements. Moreover,
we ensured that observers had to use the cue in order to be
able to respond. We employed a visual search task in which
there were always two salient elements (e.g., a red and
green target circle) popping out from the background of five
gray circles. Within all circles of the display, there were
vertical or horizontal line segments, and observers
responded to the orientation of the line segment located
within the colored target singleton. Observers were verbally
cued before display onset (e.g., the word red or green
appeared) what the target color would be on the current
trial. They responded to the orientation of the line segment
previous studies (Theeuwes and van der Burg, 2007, 2008),
observers had to process and use the cue; otherwise, they
were not able to do the task.
The present task was simple, and the intuitive prediction
was that people should be perfectly able to do this task. The
interval between cue and search display was long enough
for observers to set their attentional bias toward the relevant
color. For example, Theeuwes and van der Burg (2008)
used a rather complicated location cue that indicated that
the target would appear, for example, “at the 10 o’clock”
position on an imaginary clock. In this experiment, a 1.5-s
cue to target interval was very efficient in generating strong
location cuing effects even though observers had to
translate the complicated verbal cue (e.g., the 10 o’clock
position) into an effective attentional set. It is therefore
reasonable to assume that a fairly simple cue (e.g., such as
“attend to red”) as used in the present study, is also effective
when observers have 1.5 s to prepare.
As a measure of the efficiency of selection, we used the
identity intrusion technique first introduced in Theeuwes
and Burger (1998). The idea is that if observers are able to
perfectly select the target singleton and respond to the line
segment inside of it, then the identity of the line segment
positioned in the distractor singleton (the other popping-out
element) should have no effect on responding. However, if
selection is not perfect, and on a few trials attention goes to
the distractor singleton before going to the target singleton,
then a congruency effect is expected. In other words, if the
line segment in the distractor singleton is identical to that
inside the target singleton (i.e., congruent), observers
should respond faster than when the line segments are
incongruent (e.g., a horizontal line segment inside the target
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within the target singleton. For example, when the word red
would be presented as a cue, observers needed to respond
to the line segment inside the red singleton and to ignore
the green singleton distractor. Clearly, in contrast with oursingleton and a vertical line segment in the distractor
singleton) observers should be relatively slow (see Gibson,
& Bryant, 2008; Schreij, Owens, & Theeuwes, 2008;
Theeuwes, 1995; Theeuwes & Burger, 1998). Therefore,
the presence or absence of a congruency effect isolates the
efficiency of selection. Note that if attention does not go to
the distractor singleton, then one does not expect a
congruency effect because focal attention is needed at the
location of the distractor singleton to reveal the identity of
the line segment inside of it (see Theeuwes, van der Burg,
& Belopolsky, 2008). In this case, if the identity of the line
segment inside the distractor singleton is not available, it
cannot affect the speed of responding toward the line
segment inside the target singleton.
Experiment 1
To isolate the pure top-down attentional set effect, in
Experiment 1, we ensured that intertrial bottom-up priming
would be minimum. Previous studies investigating this so-
called “priming of pop out” have demonstrated that in these
type of tasks, priming is basically bottom-up in origin
(Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Olivers & Hickey, 2010)
and cannot be counteracted by top-down control (Pinto,
Olivers, & Theeuwes, 2005; Theeuwes et al., 2006). Note,
however, that some studies have provided evidence that
“priming of pop out” is top-down modulable (Geyer &
Müller, 2009). To avoid any influence of intertrial priming,
there was never a repetition of the target or distractor color
from one trial to the next.
Method
Observers Nine students (six females; mean age =
21.1 years, ranging from 18 to 25 years) participated in
Experiment 1 as paid volunteers. Each observer received €7
an hour. All observers were naive as to the purpose of the
experiment. The data from one observer was excluded from
further analyses because of an overall high error rate
(>10%).
Stimuli and Apparatus Experiments were run in a dimly lit,
air-conditioned cubicle. Observers were seated at approxi-
mately 80 cm from the monitor (120-Hz refresh rate).
Figure 1 shows an example of an experimental trial.
A trial started with a presentation of a light-gray fixation
dot (radius 0.4; 29.3 cd/m
2) in the middle of the screen for
a fixed period of 900 ms. The luminance of the dark-gray
background was kept constant during the experiment
(0.58 cd/m
2). Immediately following the presentation of
the fixation dot, a word cue presented in white was
displayed for a period of 850 ms at the center of the
screen. This cue indicated the color of the circle they had to
select. The characters of the word cue were presented in 18-
point Courier new font (0.46˚ height; 0.43˚ width; 29.3 cd/
m
2), and was either the word “rood,”“ groen,”“ geel,”
“blauw,”“ paars,” or “oranje” (i.e., red, green, yellow, blue,
purple and orange in Dutch, respectively).
After the cue was presented, the fixation dot reappeared
for a fixed period of 700 ms followed by a search display
with seven items equally spaced around the fixation dot on
an imaginary circle with a radius of 5.3˚ until observers
made a response. The display consisted of five gray outline
circles (radius 1.0˚; 15.6 cd/m
2), and two uniquely colored
circles, each with a unique color (red, 15.6 cd/m
2; yellow,
86.0 cd/m
2; blue, 7.53 cd/m
2; purple, 14.2 cd/m
2; green,
15.6 cd/m
2 ; and orange, 34.9 cd/m
2 ). To prevent intertrial
priming, none of the colors were repeated on the next trial.
Within the center of each outline circle, a horizontally or
vertically oriented white line segment (length 1.2˚; 29.3cd/m
2)
was presented.
Procedure Observers responded to the orientation of the
line segment (i.e., horizontal or vertical) presented inside
the colored target singleton, which was indicated by the
word cue. Note that it is impossible to do the task properly
without attending to the word cue. Observers used the “z”
and “m” keys to respond to the horizontal or vertical line
segment, respectively. A tone was presented when observ-
ers committed an error. Observers were instructed to remain
fixated on the central fixation dot during the course of a
trial. The next trial started after 1,500 ms.
Experimental design The independent variables were all
varied within subjects and within blocks of trials. The
orientation of the line segment inside the target singleton
was randomized with an equal probability of a horizontal or
a vertical target line on each trial. The orientation of the line
segment in the distractor singleton was also randomized
green
Word cue Search Screen
900 ms 850 ms 700 ms
red green gray
until response
Fig. 1 Example trial of Experiment 1. Observers were asked to search
for one of two color singletons and to respond to the line segment
inside the one that was indicated by the cue. The orientation of the line
segment inside the (cued) target singleton could be congruent (e.g.,
both horizontal) or incongruent (e.g., one horizontal and one vertical)
with the orientation of the line segment inside the other color
distractor singleton. In this example, it is congruent since the line
segment inside the target singleton (which is green) is similar to the
line segment inside the distractor singleton (which is red)
2094 Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:2092–2103with equal probability of a horizontal or vertical line in each
trial. The orientation of each line in the gray circles was
either horizontal or vertical and randomly determined. The
distance between the target and distractor singleton was
balanced. Observers practiced one block of 48 trials. Then,
they completed six experimental blocks of 48 trials each.
After each block, they were informed on the screen of their
mean RT and number of errors of that block, which they
copied on a sheet of paper to help them maintain a high
level of performance.
Results
We discarded the data from both the practice blocks and the
first three trials of each block. RT outliers (RTs > 2,500 ms)
were also discarded (0.4%). We determined whether there
were effects of congruency on RTs and errors.
RT data A t test indicated that observers were faster to
respond to the line segment inside the target singleton when
this line segment was congruent with the line segment
inside the distractor singleton (703 ms) than when the line
segment inside the target singleton was incongruent with
the line segment inside the distractor singleton (729 ms),
t(7) = 4.2; p < .005. The presence of this congruency effect
indicates that observers were unable to exclusively select
the target singleton indicated by the cue. The congruency
effect indicates that, at least on a subset of trials, observers
selected the distractor singleton before selecting the target
singleton, giving rise to the congruency effect.
Error data Overall mean error rate was 4.2%. In the
congruent condition, the error rate was 3.7%; in the
incongruent condition, it was 4.5%. This difference was
not reliable.
Furthermore, a separate ANOVA with color (red, green,
yellow, blue, purple, and orange) as a within-subjects
variable was included to investigate the difference between
the physical colors of the targets. Even though there were
RT differences between the various colors (ranging from
693 ms for yellow to 751 ms for purple), there was no
reliable statistical effect of the color used, which suggests
that these colors were more or less equally salient.
Discussion
The present results showing a clear congruency effect
indicate that observers were not able to selectively direct
their attention to the color of the target singleton, even
though they had about 1.5 s to prepare for the color of the
upcoming target singleton. The present task presents a
situation that should allow for optimal top-down control of
selection: Observers were instructed to select an item with
one of two clearly distinguishable colors. Even though this
should pose no problem to the visual system, our results
show otherwise: The clear congruency effect indicates that
at least on a subset of trials, attentional selection was not
perfect; attention must have gone first to the distractor
before it went to the target.
Note that in this task, observers must have used the
verbal cue to decide to which color singleton to respond. If
they would have ignored the cue, their responses would
have been at chance level. Clearly, our 4.2% error rate
indicates that observers used the cue.
The present findings are inconsistent with those theories
of visual search that assume a large role for top-down
control (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Folk et al., 1992;
Lien, Ruthruff, & Johnston, 2010). Because in the present
experiment the color singletons used were about equally
salient (there was no difference in RTs between the various
colors used), an increase inthe top-down weight for either
one or the other color singleton should have facilitated top-
down selection of the target singleton. The presence of the
congruency effect suggests that the top-down weight
toward the target color singleton could not prevent
attentional capture by the irrelevant color singleton.
The present results are consistent with the findings of
Theeuwes (Theeuwes et al. 2006; Theeuwes & van der
Burg, 2007), who showed that verbal top-down knowledge
cannot affect early perceptual processes. As outlined by
Theeuwes (2010b), a verbal cue may not be able to affect
these early perceptual selection processes because a verbal
instruction (e.g., “search for red”) cannot directly affect the
“cycling” of neurons. However, Theeuwes (2010a, 2010b)
argued that neurons in early visual areas coding for a
particular feature (e.g., the color red) can change their
cortical representation after these neurons have been
exposed to the actual stimulus feature (e.g., neurons need
to “cycle” in order to get set for a particular feature). In
other words, after processing the color “red” on one trial,
selection of red things on the next trial is improved. This
effect, known as “priming of pop out,” was first described
by Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994). For example, in one
of their studies, observers searched for a feature singleton
that was defined in one of two different ways: a red target
among green distractors, or a green target among red
distractors. They showed that even when the repetition of
the feature value was at chance level (i.e., repetition was
not more likely than alternation), repeating a target (but not
the response) improved performance. Feature priming
refers to the benefits in processing that result from the
repetition of features that characterize a target in visual
search. Similarly, Theeuwes and colleagues (Theeuwes et
al., 2006; Theeuwes & van der Burg, 2007) showed that
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display (e.g., a circle that was colored red) did improve
selection, a result that was also explained as the result of
intertrial priming (Pinto et al., 2005).
The aforementioned analysis suggests that intertrial
priming might change the selection weights so that
selection becomes perfect. According to this notion,
observers should be able to select the appropriate target
feature when this feature happened to be presented at the
previous trial. In Experiment 2, we tested this hypothesis.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was basically the same as Experiment 1,
except that we used only two target colors (red and green).
Furthermore, on half of the trials, the color of the target was
repeated on the next trial, and on the other half, it switched.
As in Experiment 1, observers received a verbal cue prior to
the search display, which informed them about the color of
the upcoming target singleton.
Method
Observers Ten students (eight females; mean age =
21.2 years, ranging from 18 to 25 years) participated in
Experiment 1 as paid volunteers. Each observer received €7
an hour. All observers were naive as to the purpose of the
experiment.
Stimuli, Apparatus, and Design These were identical to
those in Experiment 1, except that the color singletons were
always green and red.
Results
The results of Experiment 2 are presented in Fig. 2.W e
discarded the data from both the practice blocks and the
first three trials of each block. RT outliers were also
discarded (0.3%). Finally, we discarded trials if responding
on the preceding trial was incorrect. All data were subjected
to a repeated-measures univariate ANOVA, with target color
(repetition vs. switch) and congruency (congruent vs.
incongruent) as within-subjects variables.
RT data Observers were significantly faster when the target
color on the current trial was identical to the target color on
the previous trial (675 ms) than when the target color on the
current trial was different from the target color on the
previous trial (739 ms), F(1, 9) = 31.7, p < .001.
Furthermore, observers were faster when the orientation of
the target line was identical to the orientation of the
distractor line (696 ms) than when the orientations were
different (718 ms), F(1, 9) = 10.7, p = .01. Importantly, this
effect of target-distractor congruency was dependent on
whether the target color was repeated or switched, as
indicated by a reliable Target–Distractor Congruency ×
Target Color (switch/repeat) interaction, F(1, 9) = 11.1, p <
.01. The effect of target-distractor congruency was further
examined by separate two-tailed t tests. The t test revealed a
reliable target–distractor congruency effect (congruent,
717 ms vs. incongruent, 761 ms) when the target color on
the current trial was different from the target color on the
previous trial (switch trial), t(9) = 4.9, p = .001. In contrast,
no such congruency effect (congruent, 675 ms vs. incon-
gruent, 675 ms) was observed when the target color on the
previous trial was similar to the target color on the current
trial (repetition trial), t(9) = 0.008, p =1 .
Error data Overall mean error rate was 5.3%. There was a
trend toward a main effect of target color (switch/repeat) ,
F(1, 9) = 4.4, p = .06: Observers made fewer errors when
the target color was repeated (4.7%) than when it switched
(6.0%). There were no other effects.
Like in Experiment 1, a separate ANOVAwith color (red
and green) as a within-subjects variable was included to
investigate the difference between the physical colors of the
targets. This analysis yielded no reliable main effect of
color.
Discussion
The present results show that when a color of the target is
repeated on the next trial, there is no longer a congruency
effect, which suggests that selection is perfect. In this
condition, observers selected only the target and not the
distractor item. Notably, when the target color switched,
there was a robust congruency effect suggesting that
observers selected the distractor before selecting the target
item at least on a subset of trials. Even though in the switch
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rect reaction time and error rate
as a function of target color
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subjects designs, following
Loftus and Masson (1994). The
confidence intervals are those
fortheTargetColor×Congruency
interaction
2096 Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:2092–2103condition observers received a cue that told them with
100% certainty that the color of the target would switch on
the upcoming trial, they could not make use of it and failed
to show selective processing.
Note that in this experiment, in the condition in which
the color of the target is repeated, there is no sign of a
congruency effect, providing evidence for highly selective
processing. This is important, because in a recent study,
Folk, Remington, and Wu (2009) criticized our congruency
manipulation that we have used in previous studies (see
Schreij et al. 2008; Theeuwes, 1995; Theeuwes & Burger
1998). Folk et al. (2009) argued that one always finds a
congruency effect because in our design, there is always
parallel processing of the two popping-out singletons.
Clearly, here is a condition in which there are two
popping-out singletons, yet there is no sign of a congruency
effect, which invalidates the idea that there is always
parallel processing of popping-out elements (see also
Schreij, Theeuwes, & Olivers, 2010, for other counter
arguments).
In Experiment 1, we showed that the verbal cue did not
result in selectively attending the target singleton. The
results indicate that preparing in a top-down way for the
upcoming color singleton was not effective in preventing
attentional capture by the irrelevant color distractor.
However, in one condition of Experiment 2, we found
perfect selection: When the target color was repeated from
one trial to the next, observers selectively attended the
target singleton, as evidenced by the absence of a congruency
effect. However, one may argue that Experiment 1 was not
effective in creating perfect selection because the verbal cue
could not be translated into an effective attentional set. To
test this argument, we presented the actual color target
singleton as a cue in the center of the display. Such a
symbolic cue may help observers to prepare for the
upcoming target. It should be noted, however, that by
presenting the actual target singleton as a cue, we created a
condition that also will result in priming (see Theeuwes et
al., 2006; Theeuwes & van der Burg, 2007). Clearly, by
looking at the cue—for example, the red circle—the color
red is primed, which may give benefits in attentional
selection.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was basically the same as Experiment 1,
except that we used a symbol cue instead of a verbal cue.
This symbolic cue was the actual target singleton partic-
ipants had to search for in the upcoming search display. As
in Experiment 1, there was never a repetition of the target
or distractor color to avoid any influence of intertrial
priming.
Method
Observers Twelve students (10 females; mean age =
21.0 years, ranging from 19 to 24 years) participated in
Experiment 3 as paid volunteers. Each observer received €7
an hour. All observers were naive as to the purpose of the
experiment.
Stimuli, Apparatus, and Design These were identical to
those in Experiment 1, except that we replaced the word
cue by a symbol cue, which was always identical (i.e., same
size, color, and luminance) as the target color.
Results
We discarded the data from both the practice blocks and the
first three trials of each block. RT outliers were also
discarded (0.4%). We determined whether there were effects
of congruency on RTs and errors.
RT data Even though numerically there appears to be a
congruence effect (735 vs. 749 ms), the effect was not
statistically reliable, t(11) = 1.0; p = .3. The absence of the
congruency effect indicates that observers were able to
selectively attend the target singleton indicated by the cue,
without interference from the distractor singleton
Error data Overall mean error rate was 3.9%. In the
congruent condition, the error rate was 3.4%; in the
incongruent condition, it was 4.3%. This difference was
not reliable.
Discussion
The present findings indicate that when there is no intertrial
priming from one trial to the next, symbolic cuing is
effective. Even though there was a small congruency effect,
this turned out not to be reliable. On the basis of these data,
one may argue that the verbal cue (Experiment 1) was not
effective, whereas the symbolic cue (Experiment 3) was
effective in guiding attention in a top-down way. However,
the results may also be explained in terms of feature
priming (Theeuwes, 2010a, 2010b). Previous studies have
shown that presenting the object of search (in this case, a
color singleton) as a cue in the center of the display primes
the features of the target, resulting in a benefit in selecting
the target singleton (e.g., Theeuwes & van der Burg, 2007;
Theeuwes et al., 2006).
In the next experiment, we examined the effect of a
centrally presented symbolic cue with conditions in which
there was also intertrial (trial to trial) priming. We repeated
Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:2092–2103 2097Experiment 2, but instead of a verbal cue, we used a
symbolic cue that displayed the color target singleton that
observers had to search for. Note that on half of the trials,
the target color was repeated, and on the other half, the
target color was switched from red to green, or vice versa.
If processing the symbolic cue would result in efficient
selection (as Experiment 3 suggests), then we should find
no compatibility effect in either the condition in which there
is intertrial priming (the target color is repeated from the
next trial) or in the condition in which the color switches
from one trial to the next.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 was basically the same as Experiment 3,
except we used two target colors (red and green).
Furthermore, on half of the trials, the color of the target
was repeated on the next trial, and on the other half, it
switched. As in Experiment 3, observers received a symbol
cue prior to the search display, which informed them about
the color of the target singleton.
Method
Observers Nine students (six females; mean age =
21.2 years, ranging from 18 to 25 years) participated in
Experiment 4 as paid volunteers. Each observer received €7
an hour. All observers were naive as to the purpose of the
experiment. One particpant was excluded from further
analyses because of an overall high error rate (~15%).
Stimuli, Apparatus, and Design These were identical to
those in Experiment 3, except that the target color was
always green or red.
Results
The results of Experiment 4 are presented in Fig. 3.W e
discarded the data from both the practice blocks and the
first three trials of each block. There were no RT outliers.
Finally, we discarded trials if responding on the preceding
trial was incorrect. All data were subjected to a repeated-
measures univariate ANOVA with target color (repetition vs.
switch) and congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as
within-subjects variables.
RT data Observers were significantly faster when the target
color on the current trial was identical to the target color on
the previous trial (594 ms) than when the target color on the
current trial was different from the target color on the
previous trial (622 ms), F(1, 8) = 12.3, p < .01.
Furthermore, observers were faster when the orientation of
the target line was identical to the orientation of the
distractor line (595 ms) than when the orientations were
different (621 ms), F(1, 8) = 6.4, p < .05. Importantly, this
effect of target–distractor congruency was dependent on
whether the target color was repeated or switched, as
indicated by a reliable Target-Distractor Congruency ×
Target Color (switch/repeat) interaction, F(1, 8) = 7.8, p <
.05. The effect of target–distractor congruency was further
examined by separate two-tailed t tests. The t test revealed a
reliable target–distractor congruency effect (congruent,
602 ms vs. incongruent, 642 ms) when the target color on
the current trial was different from the target color on the
previous trial (switch trial), t(8) = 3.3, p = .01. In contrast,
no such congruency effect (congruent, 587 ms vs. incon-
gruent, 601 ms) was observed when the target color on the
previous trial was similar to the target color on the current
trial (repetition trial), t(8) = 1.2, p = .26.
Error data Overall mean error rate was 3.2%. The ANOVA
on errors yielded no reliable effects, all Fs < 2.7, ps > .14.
Discussion
The results of the present study show that intertrial priming
(the color that was processed as a target on the previous
trial) has a stronger impact than the color of the symbolic
cue that was presented just before the search display. Unlike
in Experiment 3, the symbolic cue did not result in efficient
selection: When the cue indicated a color that was different
than the color that observers processed on the previous trial,
there was a congruency effect suggesting attentional capture
by the irrelevant singleton. If we assume that the cuing
effect, as found in Experiment 3,w a sd u et oc u e –target
priming, then the present results would indicate that
intertrial priming is much stronger than cue–target priming.
Note that because of the design of the experiments, which
always uses a 100% valid cue (the cue is needed to indicate
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2098 Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:2092–2103which color singleton to respond to) we are not able to
assess the independent contributions of cue-to-target prim-
ing and intertrial priming.
Experiment 5
Experiment 5 served as a control experiment to assess the
nature of the congruency effect. One may claim that in all
previous experiments, attention may have gone directly to
the target singleton (suggesting perfect selection), and that
after selecting the target color singleton, but before
responding, observers attended to the distractor singleton,
which then may also have resulted in a congruency effect.
If this were the case, it would imply that our congruency
manipulation would not be an adequate diagnostic for
selection. To determine whether this is a viable possibility,
we presented the displays very briefly, followed by a mask.
If the congruency effect is indeed the result of selecting the
distractor singleton after selecting the target singleton, one
does not expect a congruency effect. Indeed, with very brief
displays, one expects that a second shift of attention (i.e., to
the distractor singleton) would not be possible and therefore
that one would not expect to see a congruency effect. One
the other hand, if attention is always captured immediately
by the distractor singleton before attending the target, then
one would expect this to happen also when the display is
presented relatively briefly.
Experiment 5 was identical to Experiment 2, except that
we varied the display duration. Furthermore, instead of
measuring RT, we asked participants to make an unspeeded
response toward the orientation of the line segment located
within the color target singleton.
Method
Observers Six observers (three females; mean age =
21.3 years, ranging from 19 to 26 years) participated in
Experiment 5 as paid volunteers. Each observer received €7
an hour. All observers were naive as to the purpose of the
experiment.
Stimuli, Apparatus, and Design These were identical to
Experiment 2, except the display duration was varied (8,
16, 24, 32, 48, 56, 64, and 300 ms). The search display was
immediately followed by a mask until particpants made an
unspeeded response toward the orientation of the line
segment in the target. The mask consisted of 16 white line
segments (length 1.2˚; 29.3 cd/m
2) of various orientations
(including a horizontal and vertical line), which would
appear over the line segments. Observers practiced one
block of 128 trials. Then, they completed 12 experimental
blocks of 128 trials each.
Results
The results of Experiment 5 are presented in Figs. 4 and 5.
We discarded the data from both the practice blocks and the
first trial of each block. Finally, we discarded trials when an
error was committed on the previous trial. All data were
subjected to a repeated-measures univariate ANOVA with
target color (repetition vs. switch), congruency (congruent
vs. incongruent), and display duration as within-ubjects
variables.
Proportion correct Overall proportion correct was .839.
The ANOVA yielded a reliable effect of display duration:
Partcipants performed better when the display duration
increased, F(8, 40) = 28.4, p < .001. Furthermore,
observers were better when the target color on the current
trial was identical to the target color on the previous trial
(.855) than when the target color on the current trial was
different from the target color on the previous trial (.820),
F(1, 5) = 6.4, p = .052. Importantly, the ANOVAyielded a
reliable Target–Distractor Congruency × Target color
(switch/repeat) interaction, F(1, 5) = 14.2, p =. 0 1 3 .T h e
effect of target–distractor congruency was further exam-
ined by separate two-tailed t tests. Figure 5 illustrates the
overall mean proportion correct as a function of target
color (repetition vs. switch) and congruency (collapsed
over display duration).
As is clear from Fig. 5, the effect of a target–distractor
congruency effect (congruent, .857 vs. incongruent, .856)
was not reliable when the target color on the current trial
was identical to the target color on the previous trial
(repetition trial), p = .99. In contrast, the t test revealed a
reliable target–distractor congruency effect (congruent, .842
vs. incongruent, .798) when the target color on the current
trial was different from the target color on the previous trial
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Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:2092–2103 2099(switch trial), t(5) = 2.7, p < .05. Importantly, for the
purpose of the present experiment, the three-way interaction
among target color, target–distractor congruency, and
display duration was not relaible, F < 1, indicating that
the observed effects were independent on the presentation
time of the search display. None of the other effects were
reliable.
Discussion
The results of the present experiment show a congruency
effect on accuracy for trials in which the color to search for
switched, but not for trials in which the color stayed the
same. This effect basically replicates the results of
Experiment 2, with accuracy as a measure. More impor-
tantly, this effect was not modulated by display duration,
indicating that capture occurred regardless of the display
duration.
1 On the basis of these findings, one can argue that
the congruency effect in all previous experiments is not the
result of shifting attention to the distractor singleton after
selecting the target, but instead reflects the mandatory
processing of the distractor singleton before attention is
switched to the target singleton. Consistent with previous
studies, our identity intrusion manipulation represents a true
measure of attentional capture (Gibson, & Bryant, 2008;
Schreij et al., 2008; Schreij et al., 2010; Theeuwes, 1995;
Theeuwes & Burger 1998).
General Discussion
We created a very simple task in which observers had to
selectively attend to either one of two possible colored pop-
out singletons. Even though observers had to process the
cue in order to know what they had to respond to and had
enough time to selectively prepare for the color of the
upcoming target singleton (indicated by the cue), they were
not able to selectively search for the target singleton. The
congruency analysis revealed that attention was captured by
the irrelevant distractor singleton. This study demonstrates
the limits of selecting on the basis of a top-down set.
Because the two singletons present in the display were
about equally salient (there was no reliable difference in the
absolute RTs between the various colors in experiments),
the smallest increase in top-down weight on the target color
should have tipped the weight in favor of the target and
should have selectively biased attention to the target
singleton only. Our results show that this top-down bias
was not able to prevent the processing of the irrelevant
distractor singleton.
Crucially, Experiments 2, 4, and 5 present conditions in
which perfect selection was obtained: Only if the target
color was repeated from one trial to the next, did observers
selectively attend the target singleton only. The absence of a
congruency effect indicates that the irrelevant color single-
ton did not summon attention and was completely ignored.
Note that it is unlikely that this selective processing is the
result of top-down set because the effect occurred only in
conditions in which the color of the target was repeated on
the next trial. Consistent with earlier findings (Belopolsky,
Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2010; Pinto et al., 2005; Theeuwes et
al., 2006), we attribute this effect to automatic bottom-up
intertrial priming. The processing of the color singleton on
a given trial drives the processing of that very same color
on the next trial. It is clear that top-down set as established
by the cue cannot result in selective processing; however,
bottom-up priming can.
Experiment 3, in which we prevented intertrial priming
by using a new color on every trial, showed that the
presentation of the actual target singleton as a cue also
resulted in selective processing. We attribute this effect to
cue to target priming. A previous study (Theeuwes & van
der Burg, 2007) that looked at cross-dimensional cuing
showed that this type of cuing had an effect on perceptual
sensitivity (measured in A-prime), regardless of whether the
cue was highly valid (83% validity) or whether the cue
predicted the target singleton at change level (50%).
Theeuwes et al. (2006) pushed this effect even further and
made the cue counter-predictive. For example, when a red
circle was shown as a cue, there was a high chance (83%)
that the target would be a green diamond. In other words, a
red circle as a cue indicated that observers should prepare
for a green diamond because in the majority of trials, a
green diamond was the target. The results indicated that
when a red circle served as cue even when it was counter-
predictive, it still had an effect on RTso that observers were
faster when the “unlikely” red (but primed) target singleton
was presented than when the “likely” green diamond was
presented as a target. The same was true for the reverse
1 We also analyzed whether the congruency effect in Experiment 2
only occurred for slow responses. A median split analysis in which we
examined the congruency effect for slow and fast responses showed
that the critical interaction “speedofreponse”(fastvs.slowrepsonses)×
“congruency”was notreliable (F(1, 9) = 0.2, p = .65) indicating that the
observed congruency effect was present across the whole range of fast
and slow responses.
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resulting from the cue were the same regardless of whether
cue was counter-predictive or highly predictive. These
findings strongly suggest that the effect of a symbolic cue
showing the target to search for on the upcoming trial is not
the result of top-down volitional control but is the result of
bottom-up priming.
The results of Experiment 4 show that the cue–target
priming effect cannot overcome the priming effect occur-
ring between trials. The data suggest that after processing
say, for example, a red target singleton, observers cannot
prevent the selection of a red distractor on the next trial
even when the symbolic cue shows a green circle. The
intertrial priming is particularly strong (and stronger than
cue–target priming) because the target singleton color on
one trial becomes the distractor singleton color on the next.
Previous research has shown that this type of priming
(where the target on one trial becomes the distractor on the
next) generates strong capture effects (Hickey, Chelazzi, &
Theeuwes, 2010; Pinto et al. 2005; Theeuwes, 1991)
The present findings indicate that top-down guidance
toward the target singleton is limited and does not
always lead to selectively attending the target singleton
only, a conclusion that is inconsistent with theories of
visual search that assume a large role for top-down
control. For example, the contingent capture hypothesis
predicts that observers can set themselves on each trial
for a particular color (Folk et al., 1992). Other theories
argue that visual selection is biased toward an attentional
template that ensures that objects that match the template
are selected over those that do not match the template
(Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). Guided search argues that
a top-down set can increase the salience of the relevant
feature dimension (in this example the feature “red” or
“green”) so that attention is (mostly) guided to relevant
features only (Wolfe, 1994; Wolfe et al., 2003). Note,
however, that most of these top-down attentional theories
(including GS and DW) argue that top-down selection is
never perfect (e.g., Müller et al., 2003;W o l f e ,1994)a n d
that exceptions may occur.
However, the contingent capture account argues that
selection is always fully contingent on the top-down control
setting (Folk et al., 1992). More specifically, according to
this view, selection always depends on the explicit or
implicit goals held by the observer at any given time.
Clearly, because the top-down set (what to look for) was
made explicit by the verbal cue on each trial, according to
contingent capture, top-down control should have been
evident. For example, in a recent study, Lien et al. (2010)
used a version of the spatial cuing paradigm of Folk et al.
(1992) and also verbally cued the color of the upcoming
target singleton (i.e., the letter “R” for red and “G” for
green) at the center of the display. Their Experiment 3,i n
which the color to search varied randomly from trial to trial,
showed a cue validity effect even when the color to look for
switched from one trial to the next. This led the authors to
conclude that top-down set could be applied in a highly
flexible way. It is clear that this conclusion is opposite of
ours. However, it should be noted that there are many
differences between the Lien et al. study and ours. For one,
the Lien et al. study is a spatial cuing paradigm, and
attentional selectivity is deduced on the basis of cue validity
effects. It is feasible that the crucial validity effect is
primarily driven by the invalid cue condition resulting from
trouble in disengaging attention from the invalid location
that has the same color as the target on the previous trial
(see also Belopolsky et al., 2010; and Theeuwes, 2010b, for
a similar argument).
Also, we used seven display elements, whereas Lien et
al. (2010) used only four display elements (as is typical for
contingent capture). A recent study by Yeh and Liao (2008)
showed that contingent capture no longer holds when one
runs the classic Folk et al. (1992) spatial cuing task with
eight elements. Yeh and Hiao argued that with more
nontarget elements, the target and distractor singleton
become more salient (see also Theeuwes, 2004, for a
similar argument). This implies that in the Lien et al. (2010)
study with only four elements, of which two were
considered “singletons” (e.g., a red and a green item among
two gray items), the singletons may not have been salient
enough for pop-out search, causing selection to be slow and
serial. When there are no salient elements in the display,
there is a lot of room for top-down serial guidance of
attention, as, for example, was shown for conjunction
search (Kaptein, Theeuwes, & van der Heijden, 1995). As
such, the Lien et al. (2010) study may not be comparable to
the present study in which two color singleton clearly
popped out from the background.
Our findings are consistent with theories that assume a
large role for bottom-up priming in visual search (e.g.,
Kristjánsson & Campana, 2010; Kristjánsson, Wang, &
Nakayama, 2002; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994;
Theeuwes et al., 2006; Theeuwes & van der Burg, 2008).
Our results show that observers selectively searched for the
color that was the target color on the previous trial,
irrespective of their top-down set. Only this condition
resulted in perfect selective search. We consider intertrial
priming the result of passive automatic processing, which is
impervious to prior knowledge and/or top-down processing
(see Theeuwes, 2010a, 2010b for a detailed discussion of
this account).
Consistent with this idea, Belopolsky et al. (2010)
provided convincing evidence that the notion of contingent
capture as advocated by Folk et al. (1992) may not
represent an example of top-down control but simply may
be the result of intertrial priming. Belopolsky et al. used
Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:2092–2103 2101exactly the same spatial cuing paradigm as Folk et al.
(1992), but instead of keeping the target fixed over a whole
block of trials (as is done in the original contingent capture
experiments), observers had to adopt a top-down set before
the start of each trial. In other words, observers were cued
at the beginning of each trial to look for either a unique
color or the unique onset. Contrary to the typical Folk et al.
contingent capture results, Belopolsky et al. showed that,
irrespective to the cue, both relevant and irrelevant cue
properties captured attention. Instead of top-down contin-
gent capture, they showed that the cue of the premask
display (irrelevant or irrelevant) that matched the target on
the previous trial captured attention, a result that can easily
be explained in terms of intertrial priming.
One final question is how interpriming changes the
selection priority. As outlined in Theeuwes (2010a, 2010b),
the idea is that priming may change the salience of the
feature within the priority map. In this sense, salience is not
necessarily a physical characteristic of a stimulus as it exists
in the outside world. Instead, prior history—as that, for
example, found in intertrial priming—may change the
salience of a stimulus. For example, Desimone (1996)
suggested that repeated processing of a stimulus produces a
“sharpening” of its cortical representation, possibly making
it more salient within its environment. Bichot and Schall
(2002) showed that repeating a stimulus changes responses
of neurons in the frontal eye field, a region that has been
implicated to be the neural substrate of the salience map
(Thompson & Bichot, 2005). Our notion is that salience is
not solely defined by the physical appearance of a stimulus
in the outside world, but depends on its representation in
the priority map. In this view, the processing of a stimulus
(as in intertrial priming) leads to a change in the
representation of that stimulus in the priority map, and this
change occurs independently of top-down intentions. This
type of selection is considered to be automatic and passive.
A recent finding of Olivers and Hickey (2010) provides
converging evidence for this notion. They showed that
intertrial priming results in latency shifts and amplitude
differences in the P1 component of the ERP signal—a
signal that is seen 80 to 130 ms following display onset.
Since priming affects visual processing so early, it is
unlikely to be the result of top-down processing. These
findings also make it very improbable that priming is an
example of implicit top-down guidance as, for example,
was suggested by Wolfe et al. (2003). Because the effects
occur so early in time and cannot be counteracted by
strategy in a volitional way, it is more appropriate to label
priming as automatic and bottom-up in nature (see
Theeuwes, 2010a, 2010b, for a detailed discussion).
In summary, the results of the present study demon-
strate that when two equally salient singletons are
simultaneously present in the visual field, top-down
attentional set cannot change the attentional weights in
such a way that observers exclusively attend the target
singleton, without interference from the distractor singleton.
These attentional weights can be altered only by automatic
intertrial priming, a process that is not under volitional
top-down control.
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